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Abstract: We present a hidden Markov model of discrete strategic heterogeneity and
learning in first price independent private values auctions. The model includes three latent
bidding rules: constant absolute mark-up, constant percentage mark-up, and strategic best
response. Rule switching probabilities depend upon a bidder’s past auction outcomes. We
apply this model to a new experiment that varies the number of bidders, the auction frame
between forward and reverse, and includes the collection of saliva samples - used to measure
subjects’ sex hormone levels. We find the proportion of bidders following constant absolute
mark-up increases with experience, particularly when the number of bidders is large. The
primary driver here is subjects’ increased propensity to switch strategies when they expe-
rience a loss (win) reinforcement when following a strategic (heuristic) rule. This affect is
stronger for women and leads them spend more time following boundedly rational rules. We
also find women in the Luteal and Menstrual phases of their menstrual cycle bid less aggres-
sively, in terms of surplus demanded, when following the best response rule. This combined
with spending more time following simple rules of thumbs explains gender differences in
earnings.
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1 Introduction
Economists frequently study auctions because of their common usage and their amenabil-
ity to various modes of inquiry. There is a particularly extensive literature documenting and
modeling the deviations of behavior from the predictions of standard theory in first price
sealed bid auctions experiments.1 A recent strand in this literature explores mixture models
in which a bidder may follow one of several alternative bidding rules of varying strategic
sophistication. We introduce a dynamic mixture model that allows a bidder to change his
rule in response to past auction outcomes. We estimate our model with the data from a
new experiment. This exercise generates insights into when and why bidders increase their
use of simple bidding heuristics and identifies behavioral mechanisms behind recently noted
gender earnings differences in auction experiments.
Studies of symmetric independent private value (IPV, hereafter) first price sealed bid
auctions by Crawford and Iriberri (2007), Kirchkamp and Reiss (2008), and Shachat and Wei
(2012) introduced mixture bidding models with distributions of strategic and non-strategic
bidders.2 Crawford and Iriberri (2007) formulated a Level-k model, where k indicates the
number of steps of iterated best response a bidder performs when selecting a strategy. They
considered two non-strategic k = 0 rules: bid one’s value or bid randomly according to a
uniform distribution over the interval from the minimum allowable bid to value. A k =
1 type believes all other bidders follow a particular k = 0 strategy and best responds.
Correspondingly, a k = 2 type believes all other bidders are k = 1 and best responds, and
so on. Applying this model to the first five rounds of bidding in the IPV first price auction
experiments of Goeree and Holt (2002), they found approximately 4%, 76%, and 20% of the
subjects followed the level k = 0, 1 and 2 rules, respectively. Kirchkamp and Reiss (2008)
introduced a mixture model with two types. One type simply bids a fixed markdown of
1See Kagel (1995) and Kagel and Levin (2011) for authoritative reviews of the literature.
2Isaac et al. (2012) also estimated a mixture model of reduced form linear bidding strategies for data
from an IPV first price sealed bid auction experiment with an unknown number of bidders.
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his valuation; the other is rational and best responds taking account of the proportions of
bidders following the markdown rule and those also best responding. Kirchkamp and Reiss
tested their model in an experiment that allowed bids less than the lowest possible valuation
and found roughly 30% of the subjects followed the markdown rule.
Shachat and Wei (2012) extended the previous static approach by allowing rule switch-
ing according to a first order Markov process with exogenous transition probabilities. We
estimated the model using data from an experiment on first price sealed bid reverse auctions
(bidders are trying to sell, rather than purchase, an object). The mixture model consists
of two simple pricing rules of thumb suggested by Baumol and Quandt (1964): bidding a
constant absolute mark-up of one’s cost and bidding a constant percentage mark-up on one’s
cost. The third bidding rule is to best respond to the mixture probabilities and mark-up
parameters. Like previous studies, we found initial high frequencies of strategic bidding
in early auctions with approximately 75% of the subject following the best response rule.
Surprisingly this percentage quickly fell to a steady state of approximately 62% and the per-
centage of absolute mark-up bidding rises to over 30%. Skepticism of this result is natural;
the model lacks a behavioral mechanism explaining this learning to bid irrationally.
This paper extends this dynamic discrete heterogeneity approach by modeling rule switch-
ing as a function of how bidders react to ex post auction outcomes. We do this through
myopic rule specific reinforcement learning dynamics similar to those introduced by Erev
and Roth (1998) into the behavioral economic literature. Specifically, the relative attrac-
tiveness of the currently adopted rules adjusts when (1) the bidders wins the auction or (2)
the bidder loses the auction and could have profitably won with an alternative bid. We call
the current model the Hidden Markov Bidding Model, or simply the HMBM.
Only a limited number of studies have addressed how individuals learn to bid over time
in first price auctions. The most developed of these literature strands uses the directional
learning framework of Selten and Buchta (1998). Directional learning is a behavioral prin-
ciple where individuals adjust their strategies toward those offering ex-post higher payoffs
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conditional upon available information. Studies such as (Selten and Buchta, 1998; Guth
et al., 2003; Neugebauer and Selten, 2006) estimate how bidding rules adjust according to
the ex post information provided on auction outcomes. These models, unlike ours, have
individuals calculating the counterfactual payoffs for strategies not played.
Using the HMBM to analyze the new experiment, we offer insights into the recent efforts
of Chen et al. (2013), Pearson and Schipper (2013), and Schipper (2012) to document and
explain gender differences in earnings in IPV first price sealed bid forward auction exper-
iments.3 These three studies examined bidding behavior through reduced form regression
models with socioeconomic covariates, controls for risk attitudes collected in a lottery choice
task, information on the use of oral hormonal contraceptives, and the current phase of a
female subject’s menstrual cycle.4 These studies found that women bid higher and earn less
than their male counterparts when they are in the Luteal and Menstrual phases of their
Menstrual cycle - this is the second half of the cycle when there is a lower likelihood of con-
ception; we call these subjects LP Females. Meanwhile, these gender differences are absent or
reduced for women in the Follicular or Ovulatory phases of their cycle; we call these subjects
HP Females. Interestingly the effects are stronger for women who use oral contraceptives
versus those who don’t. In our new experiment, the subject pool is mainland Chinese uni-
versity students, none of whom reported using hormonal contraceptives. Nonetheless, we
find similar earnings differences.
We estimate the HMBM with data from a new experiment that involves two within-
subject treatments and the collection of saliva samples to measure levels of three different
sex hormones. Each experimental session consists of 18 subjects participating in a sequence
of 100 n-bidder first price IPV auctions. The first treatment variable is the auction frame.
50 of the auctions are forward auctions where the bidders attempt to purchase an object and
3Note, Casari et al. (2007) also document gender performance differences in first price common value
auction experiments.
4Chen et al. (2013) and Pearson and Schipper (2013) collect the relevant use of contraceptive and
menstrual cycle information from surveys, and Schipper (2012) augments survey information with the mea-
surements of various sex hormones from saliva samples.
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the other 50 are reverse auctions. This treatment identifies differences in the bidding rules
of thumb used when in the role of a buyer versus when in the role of the seller. While the
forward and reverse framing are analogous in standard game theoretic models, the percentage
mark-up rule will generate quite different outcomes and earnings in the two frames. The
second treatment variable is the number of bidders n. Half of the time n = 3, and the
other half of the time n = 6. This variation creates identification between the best response
rule and the percentage mark-up rule in the forward auction frame. We also collect a saliva
sample from each subject before and after the 100 auctions. These two samples are combined
and then tested for levels of Testosterone, Estradiol, and Progesterone.
The estimated HMBM provides the following insights.
1. We find substantial variation in the bidding rule parameters according to gender types.
One of the most relevant variations is that LP Females have greater implied risk aver-
sion than HP Females or Males when following the rational bidding rule.
2. For LP and HP Females, the probability of switching from a rational bidding rule
to a boundedly rational one spikes after losing an auction that could have been won
profitably.
3. The probability that a subject switches from the constant absolute mark-up rule to
the best response rule spikes after a bidder wins the auction.
4. The gender differences in these reinforcement effects leads both LP and HP Females
to spend more time using boundedly rational rules than Males.
5. The nature of these feedbacks leads to decreasing use of rational rules over time in 6
bidder auctions.
6. We show that about 75% of the earnings difference between Males and LP Females in
forward auctions - there is no such earnings difference in reverse auctions - arises from
differences in parameter variations within rules and 25% from the differences in the
time using alternative rules.
We present the HMBM in the next section. Then we describe the experimental design.
This is followed by an analysis of gender earnings differences in the data. In the penultimate
section, we present the estimated bidding model and the bulk of the empirical results. We
offer discussion of the scope of our results and extensions in the conclusion. There are two
appendices: one presenting some of the detailed theoretical analysis and another detailing
the Gibbs Sampler and Markov Chain Monte Carlo method used to conduct the Bayesian
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estimation.
2 The Hidden Markov Bidding Model
We consider the setting in which a bidder participates in a sequence of single object
auctions, indexed t = 1, . . . , T . In each auction there are nt bidders, indexed by i. Each
bidder is characterized by a vector of time invariant socioeconomic variables zi. The auction
frame, fit, denotes whether the auction is a forward (F ) or reverse (R) one. While the
number of bidders and the frame may vary within the auction sequence, these values are
always common knowledge. A bidder’s type in an auction period, denoted vit, is private
information. In a forward action vit is bidder i’s value for the object, and in a reverse
auction it is his cost. Each vit is an independent draw from the uniform distribution on [L,H].
Bidders simultaneously submit bids in a forward (reverse) auction; the one submitting the
highest (lowest) bid purchases (sells) the object and pays (receives) the amount of his bid.
The winning bidder’s payoff is the amount of realized consumer (producer) surplus, and
losing bidders’ payoffs are zero. Bidders are myopic - only concerning themselves with the
current auction payoff - and types are drawn anew each auction.
The HMBM consists of three components. First, there is a finite set of latent linear
bid rules mapping from the auction frame and bidder type to bid amount. This set can
consist of rules derived strategically and those representing simple heuristics. The strategies
are latent because a bidder follows his strategy subject to some random perturbation. The
second component is an exogenous multinomial distribution governing the initial assignment
of bidders to bidding rules. The third component is a first order Markov matrix of transition
probabilities governing the switching of rules. These transition probabilities are functions of
a bidder’s previous auction participation outcome.
2.1 The set of latent bidding rules
We assume the set of latent bidding rules contains three elements, {AM,PM,BR} with
generic element s, each reflecting a distinct behavioral heuristic. The constant absolute
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mark-up (AM) bidder always demands a fixed surplus independent of his value. The AM
bidding rule is the affine function with slope of one,
bAM(vit|fit, zi) = κ(fit, zi) + vit + AMit.
We specify that the markup parameter κ(fit, zi), or expressed more compactly as κ, should
be negative for forward frames and positive for reverse frames. It is a linear combination of
the socioeconomic effects conditional on the frame. We don’t impose that κ, conditional of
the value of zi, has the same magnitude in the two auction frames. Also notice that the AM
bidding rule does not depend up the number of bidders nor the distribution of private types.
Finally, AMit is a heteroscedastic independent random perturbation following the normal
distribution with mean of zero and variance of σ2AM(zi).
The constant percentage mark-up (PM) bidder always demands surplus that is a fixed
percentage of his realized type. Thus, the PM bidding rule, conditional on the frame is,
bPM(vit|fit, zi) =
(
1 + ρ(fit, zi)
)
vit + PMit
Again we allow the possibility that percentage mark-up ρ(fit, zi), compactly denoted ρ, may
differ in sign and magnitude in forward and reverse auctions. The PM rule, like the AM
rule, does not depend up the number of bidders nor the distribution of private types. Finally
note that this rule is adopted imperfectly with the heteroscedastic independent normally
distributed perturbation PMit with a mean of zero and variance of σ
2
PM(zi).
The final latent bidding rule is the strategic best response or BR. A bidder adopting
the BR rule maximizes his expected utility conditional upon his realized type, the mark-
up parameters κ and ρ, the number of bidders n, and his beliefs regarding the rules each
of the bidders is currently adopting. Regarding these beliefs, let piAM be the probability
any bidder is a AM bidder, piPM be the probability any bidder is a PM bidder, and that
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(1 − piAM − piPM) is the probability any bidder is a BR bidder.5 We assume each bidder
has the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function U(y) = ηy
1
η , where y is a non-
negative change in wealth and η is his constant coefficient of relative risk aversion and can
be a linear function of zi, denoted η(zi). In Appendix A, we show the BR bidding rule is:
bBR(vit|fit, zi) =

(L+ piAMκ)(1 + ρ)[






vit + BRit if fit = F
(H + piAMκ)(1 + ρ)[






vit + BRit if fit = R
,
where M = η(zi)(n−1)+1. The heteroscedastic random perturbation BRit is independently
normally distributed with a mean of zero and variance of σ2BR(zi).
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The BR rule has two notable features. First, the mark-up rule parameters κ and ρ, and
the beliefs about the distribution of bidding types only affect the intercept term. Second,
when the number of bidders and the risk attitude are consistent between the forward and
reverse frames, the slope terms are the same.
At this point, we have a fully formulated static model, from which we can generate several
alternative models with appropriate restrictions on parameters and beliefs. The Bayes-Nash
equilibrium model (Vickrey, 1961) occurs when beliefs are 1−piAM−piPM = 1 and we restrict
bidders to be risk neutral, i.e. η(zi) = 1. If we instead restrict the constant coefficient of
risk aversion to be the same for all bidders and in the open unit interval, we obtain the risk
averse Bayes-Nash equilibrium model of Holt (1980). We recover the model of Kirchkamp
and Reiss (2008) by setting piPM = 0. Finally, we can obtain a version of the Level-k model
of Crawford and Iriberri (2007) by setting piAM = 1 and the absolute mark-up κ = 0.
5In the repeated auction context we can think of these beliefs as a state variable. While the myopia
assumption allows us think of a bidder as only concerned about his current auction payoff, the formation
of these beliefs can involve a complicated inference problem depending upon the informational feedback
provided in the auction. In our experiment, subjects are randomly rematched into new bidding cohorts
every period which eliminates this conditional inference problem.
6It is important to note that we assume the BR bidder does not consider the noise terms rit when calcu-
lating his optimal bid as he would in statistical equilibrium concepts like the Quantal Response Equilibrium
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).
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2.2 Markovian rule switching and auction feedback
In the HMBM, the evolution of strategy adoption begins with an initial assignment
bidding rules according to multinomial distribution Π1. The variable sit indicates the rule
bidder i uses in auction t. From the second auction onward, we assume sit depends upon
sit−1, the feedback from i’s participation in auction t− 1, and the socioeconomic variable zi.
We summarize the transition probabilities with the Markov matrix P ,
P =

PrBR,BR(oit−1, zi) PrBR,AM(oit−1, zi) PrBR,PM(oit−1, zi)
PrAM,BR(oit−1, zi) PrAM,AM(oit−1, zi) PrAM,PM(oit−1, zi)
PrPM,BR(oit−1, zi) PrPM,AM(oit−1, zi) PrPM,PM(oit−1, zi)
 ,
where Prjk(oit−1, zi) = Pr(sit = j|sit−1 = k, oit−1, zi) is the transition probability of moving
from bidding rule j to bidding rule k, and oit−1 is the feedback bidder i receives from his
participation in auction t− 1.
We classify the outcome oit, as one of three possible types; NR, LR, and WR. The
NR outcome is neutral reinforcement ; the bidder loses the auction, but there was no other
bid at which he could have won and earned positive surplus. The second outcome is loss
reinforcement (LR) in which the bidder loses the auction but there was an alternative bid
at which he could have won and earned positive surplus. The final potential outcome is win
reinforcement (WR); the bidder wins the auction.
We quantify these auction outcome effects through a state dependent index indicating the
attractiveness of each rule. We assume the auction outcome adjusts the index of a bidder’s
adopted rule prior to the determination his subsequent rule. Bidder i’s rule indices for period




it if j 6= k
γjkzi +DLR(γj1zi + γj2ziLit) +DWR(γj3zi + γj4ziWit) + ξ
jk
it if j = k
, (1)
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where ξjkit is an independent standard normal innovation.
7 The dummy variable Dx takes
the value of one when oit = x and zero otherwise. Loss or win reinforcements have affine
impacts on the index of the adopted strategy. The variables Lit and Wit are the surplus
amounts associated with the respective reinforcements calculated as follows:
Lit =
vit − pit if fit = Fpit − vit if fit = R ,
where pit is the winning bidding in auction t, and
Wit =
vit − bit if fit = Fbit − vit if fit = R .
We assume bidder i transitions to the bidding rule with the largest index Ψjkit . This
implies that each row of the matrix P is a multinomial probit choice model.
3 Experiment design
We ran all experiments at the Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory (FEEL)
of Xiamen University. We used the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004) to recruit subjects. All
subjects were either undergraduate or Master level students from a cross section of schools
in the university. The study consisted of 10 sessions each with 18 subjects. Each session
took approximately 2 hours to complete a common sequence of four tasks:
Task 1: collection of a saliva sample which includes reading task specific instructions,
Task 2: reading instructions for and participation in 100 auction periods,
Task 3: completion of a survey, and
Task 4: collection of a second saliva sample.
After completing the four tasks, we paid subjects privately as they exited one-by-one.
7Setting the variance term σ2ξ equal to one is without loss of generality, it allows identification of the
transition probability parameters.
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3.1 The auction task
Within the 100 auction periods of each session there are two within subject treatments:
the auction frame (forward and reverse), and the number of bidders (3 and 6). After period
50, we switch the auction frame and make a public announcement to remind subjects of
this. In one-half of the sessions subjects participate in the forward frame first, and the
other sessions start with the reverse frame. Within the first 50 auction periods, we vary
the numbers of bidders between the first and second blocks of 25 periods. This order is
switched in the second session half. Table 1 presents the sequences of these treatments for
each session. Subjects are randomly matched in new groups each period to limit repeated
game effects.
Table 1: The assigned sequence of within subject treatments by experimental session
Session Periods 1-25 Periods 26-50 Periods 51-75 Periods 76-100
1 Forward; n =6 Forward; n =3 Reverse; n =3 Reverse; n =6
2 Forward; n =3 Forward; n =6 Reverse; n =6 Reverse; n =3
3 Forward; n =3 Forward; n =6 Reverse; n =6 Reverse; n =3
4 Forward; n =6 Forward; n =3 Reverse; n =3 Reverse; n =6
5 Forward; n =3 Forward; n =6 Reverse; n =6 Reverse; n =3
6 Reverse; n =6 Reverse; n =3 Forward; n =3 Forward; n =6
7 Reverse; n =6 Reverse; n =3 Forward; n =3 Forward; n =6
8 Reverse; n =3 Reverse; n =6 Forward; n =6 Forward; n =3
9 Reverse; n =3 Reverse; n =6 Forward; n =6 Forward; n =3
10 Reverse; n =6 Reverse; n =3 Forward; n =3 Forward; n =6
Each auction is a first price sealed bid auction. In each period, the computer program8
informs a subject of the auction frame, the number of bidders, and his value/cost. Each
subject is asked to submit a bid in the range of 0 to 60. The subject who bids the highest
(lowest) price in each group of bidders wins the forward (reverse) auction and pays (receives)
the amount of his bid.9 After the auction concludes, the computer program informs each
subject whether or not he won, the winning price and his payoff in the period. Note during
8Developed with the Z-tree programming language (Fischbacher, 2007).
9In the case of multiple subjects submitting the winning bid amount within a group, one of them is
randomly selected to be the auction winner.
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the auction periods, a subject can view his entire past auction experience.
To directly compare the impact of auction frame, we use the symmetrical setting between
the forward and reverse formats. For each of the 50 forward auctions, subject i’s values are
independently drawn from a uniform distribution on the range 20 to 40. Suppose Vi is the
vector of these realized draws. For the 50 reverse auctions, subject i’s cost vector is generated
by the formula Ci = 40− (Vi−20) = 60−Vi. So there are 50 pairs of value and cost for each
subject. The orders of first 25 elements of Vi and Ci are randomly sorted to form the actual
sequence of types in the 3 bidder auctions, and the last 25 are randomly sorted to form the
actual sequence of types in the 6 bidder auctions.
3.2 Salivary hormone sampling, socioeconomic survey, and the
construction of gender variables
We collect a saliva sample from each subject, which we have tested for levels of proges-
terone, estradiol, and testosterone.10 In the invitation to participate, subjects are informed
that they will provide two saliva samples in the session. We collect a sample from each sub-
ject at the beginning and at the end of the session, then we combine these two samples. On
average, the two samples are taken one hour and forty-five minutes apart. Then, all subjects’
samples are analyzed at the Xiamen University School of Medicine.11 As food consumption
can result in erroneous salivary hormone measurements, we take two precautions. First, all
the sessions start at either 3:00 or 7:30pm (2.5 hours after the standard lunch time or 1.5
hours after the standard dinner time of Xiamen University). Second, before subjects entered
the lab, we sequentially ask each to gargle three times to remove possible food residues.
In the third task, subjects complete a computerized survey. The survey contains questions
about individual characteristics for all subjects and, for female subjects, additional questions
10We do not use the measurements of estradiol and testosterone in the reported data analysis. In un-
reported results, we find the levels of these two hormones uncorrelated with earnings or bidding behavior.
This surprising non-significant results, especially with respect to testosterone, is also consistent with Schipper
(2012) which studies the correlation between sex hormone levels and the levels auction earnings and bids.
11The three testing kits we used to analyze samples come from the DRG International, Incorporated. Their
website provides technical descriptions of the kit, testing procedure, and other specifications for Progesterone,
Estradiol, and Testosterone.
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about their menstrual cycle.
We combine survey responses regarding the timing of a subject’s last menstrual cycle
and her measured level of progesterone to divide female participants into two categories: LP
Female and HP Female. In the LP Female category, a female subject is either in the Luteal
Phase (salivary progesterone is higher than 99.1 pg/ml) or in the first 5 days of her menstrual
cycle (determined by the response to the survey question, “How many days ago was the start
of your last menstruation?”). Otherwise, the female subject is included in the HP Female
category; i.e., in the Follicular or Ovulatory phases of the Menstrual cycle. Hence, the
LP Female and HP Female categories correspond to relatively low and high probabilities of
conception. In total, our study includes 81 Males (M), 44 LP Females, and 55 HP Females.
Finally, note the use of hormonal contraceptives is extremely low amongst Chinese college
students12, and no subject affirmatively answered the survey question about the use of oral
contraceptives. Thus female subjects in our study are all naturally cycling women.
4 Earnings treatment effects
In this section we examine whether our study replicates previously documented differ-
ences in earnings by gender types. We also probe deeper to look at how the interaction of
auction format, the number of bidders, and gender impact earnings. Table 2 presents the
average auction earnings, in Chinese renminbi, and the standard deviation. The columns
are organized by gender categories, and the rows by the auction framing and the number of
bidders. First, we can see our experiment replicates the payoff earnings differences recorded
by Pearson and Schipper (2013) and Schipper (2012), LP Females earn less than HP Fe-
males and Males in the 3 bidder forward auctions.13 However, payoffs are flat across gender
classifications in 6 bidder auctions. This is not surprising as, by the sheer force of greater
competition, 6 bidder auctions yield low earning levels by construction. With respect to the
12A survey of over 74,000 students across 8 mainland Chinese universities by Zhou et al. (2009) reported
that only 10.1% of the female respondents reported to previously had sex, and of these sexually active females
only 28.8% report using oral contraceptives.
13Our results are not an exact replication as other studies only look at two-bidder auctions.
13
auction frame effect, pooled earnings of subjects are slightly lower in the reverse than the
forward frame, and differences across gender classifications are smaller as well.
Table 2: Auction task earnings: average and standard deviation
Format Bidders Total Male Female HP Female LP Female
n = 3 19.44 20.57 18.52 21.18 15.20
8.66 9.15 8.18 8.65 6.18
Forward n = 6 7.54 7.84 7.29 7.04 7.60
4.35 4.28 3.93 3.51 4.42
n = 3 & 6 26.97 28.41 25.81 28.22 22.80
10.05 10.94 9.16 9.54 7.75
n = 3 18.98 18.99 18.79 19.97 17.72
9.21 9.20 9.26 8.47 10.12
Reverse n = 6 7.22 7.79 6.76 6.78 6.74
4.91 5.43 4.41 4.58 4.24
n = 3 & 6 26.20 26.78 25.73 26.75 24.46
11.29 11.68 11.00 10.17 11.95
n = 3 38.42 39.56 37.49 41.15 32.92
14.07 15.76 14.50 13.62 14.42
For & Rev n = 6 14.76 15.63 14.06 13.83 14.34
8.02 8.91 7.19 7.07 7.41
n = 3 & 6 53.18 55.19 51.55 54.98 47.26
17.86 19.31 16.51 15.47 16.95
We test the differences in earnings within the different categories of the levels of gen-
der classification, number of bidders, and auction frame using two sided t-tests and non-
parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. We report the p-values of these tests in Table 3. The
only statistical rejections we find involve Males vs. LP Females and HP vs LP Females in
the forward auctions. However, we see these rejections arise because of the differences in
the 3 bidder auctions. Thus we find the same results as Pearson and Schipper (2013) and
Schipper (2012); men outperform women only when they are in the high fertility phase of
their menstrual cycles.14 However, we find these results only hold in the 3 bidder forward
auction, failing to extend to the reverse auction and 6 bidder cases.
14Our results are partially consistent with Chen et al. (2013), who find the payoff ordering Male, HP
Female, and LP Female.
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Table 3: Reported p-values for two sided hypothesis tests for differences in average earnings
Null n = 3&6 n = 3 n = 6
Hypothesis t-test Wilcoxon t-test Wilcoxon t-test Wilcoxon
For = Rev 0.49 0.67 0.63 0.65 0.52 0.32
For & Rev M = F 0.18 0.16 0.37 0.58 0.20 0.28
M = HP 0.94 0.88 0.53 0.41 0.19 0.31
M = LP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.39 0.44
LP = HP 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.73 0.85
Forward M = F 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.43 0.58
M = HP 0.91 0.88 0.75 0.79 0.27 0.51
M = LP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.90
HP = LP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.70
Reverse M = F 0.54 0.43 0.94 0.74 0.17 0.08
M = HP 0.99 0.88 0.61 0.65 0.30 0.14
M = LP 0.30 0.22 0.49 0.98 0.20 0.21
HP = LP 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.63 0.87 0.88
5 Estimation Results
In this section we present the estimates of the HMBM. We find gender differences in
the parameters of the latent bidding rules. We also find gender differences in the response
to auction feedback. Specifically we find, when following the BR bidding rule, both LP
and HP Females react to loss reinforcement causing a sharp increase in the probability of
switching to a non-strategic bidding rule. All subjects are sensitive to win reinforcement
when following the AM bidding rule. In this case, the probability of abandoning the AM
rule and switching to the rational BR rule rises sharply. These reactions lead to different
dynamic paths of rule adoption, with Females spending more time following simple bidding
heuristics. We finally show how both differences in the bidding rules and the amount of time
spent following non-strategic rules contribute to the gender differences in earnings.
We adopt a Bayesian statistical approach to estimate the unknown parameters of the
HMBM. The exercise starts by specifying independent and diffuse marginal priors on the
parameters. Then we use an iterative Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) with a Gibbs
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sampler to generate estimates of the marginal posterior distributions of the parameters. A
key property of this procedure is that the empirical distribution of random parameter draws
converges to the true marginal posteriors. Thus, we conduct 3000 iterations and establish
that the empirical distributions of the drawn parameters has converged (Geweke, 1991).
Then we run the procedure an additional 2000 iterations, from which we construct empirical
density functions. These empirical density functions are used to calculate the posterior
means and confidence intervals reported in this section. In an appendix, we provide a full
description of this statistical procedure.
The are a couple of items to consider before proceeding. First, the vector of socioeconomic
variables, zi we consider contains only indicator variables for the three gender classifications
M , HP , and LP . The dummy variables DF and DR are used to indicate a Forward and
Reverse auction frame respectively.
5.1 Estimated bidding rules
We first consider the estimated posterior means of the AM and PM bidding rule pa-
rameters, presented in Table 4 along with respective 95% confidence intervals. Columns 3-5
report the posterior means straddled by the upper and lower bound of the 95% confidence
intervals. In the forward auction we see the absolute consumer surplus demanded is quite
low, roughly sixty cents below value. Also there is a small, both in terms of economic and
statical significance, gender difference with the absolute mark-up of Males lower than those
of the LP and HP Females. In the reverse auction, the absolute mark-ups are significantly
smaller for all the gender types. With respect to the percentage mark-up demanded by PM
bidders, there is also a gender effect. But in this case, Male bidders are more aggressive in
the mark-up demands than both Female types. Unlike the AM bidding rule, there is no
significant effect on the auction frame and the size of the mark-up.
Next we consider the estimated BR bidding rule parameters. First we examine the slope
terms, reported for the 3 bidder auctions. There is a statistically significant ordering of
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Table 4: Mark-up bidding rule parameters: posterior means with 95% confidence intervals
Rule Variable Male HP Female LP Female
DF · κ -0.59 −0.56 -0.53 -0.65−0.61 -0.58 -0.64−0.60 -0.56
AM DR · κ 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.40 0.44 0.48
σ2AM 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.17
DF · ρ -0.72 −0.58 -0.45 -0.45−0.40 -0.36 -0.51−0.39 -0.30
PM DR · ρ 0.35 0.48 0.60 0.38 0.43 0.48 0.24 0.32 0.40
σ2PM 115.18131.64 150.68 18.55 20.96 23.88 31.39 38.50 47.82
the slope terms that is increasing for Male, HP Females, and LP Females. This ordering is
consistent with increasing coefficients of constant relative risk aversion η across the gender
classifications. Also this bid responsiveness to type is the same across auction frames -
thus when following a strategic rule - bidders do treat the forward and reverse auctions
isometrically. The change in the slope going from 3 to 6 bidders is in the correct direction;
however, the magnitude does not reflect a constant η.15 One surprising result, is that gender
differences in the slope are not found in the six bidder auctions.
5.2 Estimated endogenous rule switching probabilities
We report the estimates the parameters of attractiveness indices underlying the multino-
mial probit models of rule transition probabilities in Table 6. Examination of these results
reveals a interesting asymmetry. The only impact of loss reinforcement is a reduction in the
attractiveness of the BR strategy, and the only impact of win reinforcement is a reduction in
the attractiveness of the AM strategy. In other words, when a subject follows the strategic
rule and loses the auction when he could have won with a lower surplus demanding bid, this
increases the probability of switching to one of the simple bidding heuristics. It’s as though
one regrets following such aggressive strategies. On the other hand, when a subject follows
15Not finding constant coefficients of relative risk aversion when the number of bidders changes is a leading
critique against risk aversion based explanations of overbidding in first price auctions; for example, see Kagel
and Levin (1993).
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Table 5: Strategic Best Response (BR) bidding rule parameters: posterior means with 95%
confidence intervals
Variable Male HP Female LP Female
DF 3.59 3.89 4.21 2.84 3.21 3.58 2.16 2.53 2.87
DF ·D6 -2.01−1.59 -1.18 -2.48−1.92 -1.36 -1.28−0.77 -0.23
DR 7.38 7.70 8.01 6.64 7.02 7.42 5.73 6.14 6.57
DR ·D6 -2.30−1.85 -1.40 -2.72−2.17 -2.72 -2.60−2.03 -1.48
DF · vit 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87
DF ·D6 · vit 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.05
DR · vit 0.79 0.80 0.81 -0.81 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.86
DR ·D6 · vit 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08
σ2BR 0.91 0.96 1.02 0.78 0.83 0.90 0.61 0.68 0.74
the simple absolute mark-up rule and wins the auction, then this increases the probability
of switching away from this strategy and, as we shall see shortly, predominantly towards the
BR strategy. It appears, in this case, subjects regret following the conservative non-strategic
rule.
There are some clear gender differences in these reinforcements. Let’s first focus on the
loss reinforcement effects when following the BR rule. For LP Females, their is a significant
negative impact from simply experiencing the loss reinforcement state, captured by DLR
coefficient, that does not vary with the size of the loss, captured by the Lit coefficient. HP
females also experience a significant impact, but in this case the impact proportional to the
size of loss. Males do not exhibit a significant loss reinforcement effect.
Now turning our attention to the AM bidding rule and the impact of win reinforcement.
First note by definition, the size of Wit conditional upon experiencing a win reinforcement
state should have little variation. Thus, there should be some co-linearity between the vari-
ables Wit and DWR. Inspection of the estimates of the coefficients reveals significant negative
impact of DWR for HP Females, and Wit for LP Females and Males. When combining the
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Table 6: Estimated reinforcement effects on rule attractiveness indices: posterior means with
95% confidence intervals
Rule Variable Male HP Female LP Female
BR DWR -0.12 0.02 0.15 -0.18 0.00 0.17 -0.16 0.04 0.24
Wit -0.14−0.07 0.00 -0.14−0.05 0.07 -0.22−0.11 0.02
DLR -0.44−0.18 0.10 -0.54−0.24 0.07 -0.83−0.50 -0.19
Lit -0.14−0.03 0.09 -0.31−0.16 -0.02 -0.19−0.02 0.16
AM DWR -0.23 0.06 0.35 -0.64−0.32 -0.01 -0.45−0.13 0.19
Wit -0.80−0.44 -0.09 -0.51−0.13 0.24 -0.90−0.52 -0.11
DLR -0.41−0.01 0.41 -0.42 0.06 0.57 -0.40 0.09 0.60
Lit -0.44 0.08 0.65 -0.60−0.04 0.50 -0.61−0.03 0.58
PM DWR -0.15 0.30 0.80 -0.49 0.07 0.63 -0.08 0.44 0.95
Wit -0.17−0.08 0.02 -0.10 0.06 0.38 -0.21−0.04 0.20
DLR -0.70−0.26 0.19 -0.65−0.24 0.18 -0.65−0.18 0.33
Lit -0.15−0.04 0.07 -0.09 0.02 0.13 -0.26−0.09 0.08
estimates of these coefficients with their respective estimated values of the absolute mark-ups
κ in Table 4, we find the impact is the similar across gender classifications.
The estimated values of the reinforcement coefficients alone doesn’t adequately convey
how these outcomes affect the transition probability matrix P . To better convey how the
auction outcome impacts P , we calculate the estimated matrix P for each of the three auction
outcomes and the three gender classification. We report these the estimated P ’s in Table 7.
When inspecting the posterior mean transition probabilities there are three consistent
regularities. First, the continuation probabilities of following the same rule, given in the
grey filled cells on the main diagonals, are usually larger than 0.60. This suggests inertia
in subjects’ rule adoptions. The small number of cases where this doesn’t hold we discuss
shortly. Second, when subjects transition away from one of the non-strategic rules, AM and
PM , it will almost always be to the strategic PM rule. In other words, the probability of
switching from one non-strategic rule to another is very low. See the underlined transition
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probabilities in Table 7. Third, when subjects switch away from the BR rule, they are much
more likely to adopt the AM rather than the PM rule. These general characteristic are
similar to those of Shachat and Wei (2012); indicating they are robust to auction frames,
subject pools, and the number of bidders.
The impact of the different reinforcements, and gender differences in these impacts, are
also evident in Table 7. Consider the differences in P between neutral versus loss rein-
forcement outcomes. For Males, the only difference is the reduction in the continuation
probability of the PM rule. However, for both HP and LP females loss reinforcement leads
to a reduction in the BR continuation probability from 0.89 to 0.72 and 0.76 respectively.
Loss Reinforcement also negatively impacts the LP Female’s continuation probability of PM
as well.
Now consider the differences in P between neutral and win reinforcements. There is no
discernable impact in the BR continuation probability for any gender type. However, win
reinforcement reduces the AM continuation probability for Males and LP Females respec-
tively from 0.82 and 0.86 to 0.45. For HP females there is a reduction from 0.86 to 0.61.
With respect to the PM rule, win reinforcement leads to increases in the PM continuation
probability for all three gender classifications.
5.3 Evolution of bidding rule adoption
We show the estimated HMBM leads to different dynamic patterns of rule adoption for
different gender classifications. One of the key latent variables in the HMBM is the sequence
of bidding rule states a subject occupies over the 100 auction periods. The Gibbs sampler
generates a realization of this random latent sequence for each subject in every iteration of
the MCMC estimation. We calculate the mean posterior estimate of this sequence for each
subject as follows. For auction period t, we calculate the proportion of the 2000 realized
bidding rule sequences the subject adopts each bidding rule. The we average element-by-
element the appropriate sets of individual sequences to form different aggregate series of
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Table 7: Transition matrices conditional upon auction outcome and gender classification
Neutral Loss Win
Reinforcement Reinforcement Reinforcement
BRt AMt PMt BRt AMt PMt BRt AMt PMt
MaleA
BRt−1 0.89 0.08 0.03 BRt−1 0.84 0.12 0.04 BRt−1 0.86 0.11 0.03
AMt−1 0.20 0.80 0.01 AMt−1 0.18 0.82 0.00 AMt−1 0.55 0.45 0.00
PMt−1 0.34 0.02 0.63 PMt−1 0.48 0.03 0.49 PMt−1 0.29 0.02 0.69
BRt AMt PMt BRt AMt PMt BRt AMt PMt
HP
FemaleB
BRt−1 0.89 0.09 0.02 BRt−1 0.72 0.22 0.06 BRt−1 0.87 0.11 0.03
AMt−1 0.17 0.82 0.00 AMt−1 0.14 0.86 0.00 AMt−1 0.38 0.61 0.01
PMt−1 0.20 0.02 0.78 PMt−1 0.25 0.02 0.74 PMt−1 0.18 0.02 0.81
BRt AMt PMt BRt AMt PMt BRt AMt PMt
LP
FemaleC
BRt−1 0.89 0.09 0.02 BRt−1 0.76 0.19 0.05 BRt−1 0.85 0.12 0.03
AMt−1 0.16 0.84 0.00 AMt−1 0.14 0.86 0.00 AMt−1 0.54 0.45 0.01
PMt−1 0.30 0.03 0.67 PMt−1 0.41 0.04 0.56 PMt−1 0.21 0.02 0.77
A Evaluated at the following average Win and Loss reinforcement levels: BR, W = 2.69 and L = 1.83; AM , W = 0.65
and L = 0.42; and PM , W = 5.31 and L = 3.68.
B Evaluated at the following average Win and Loss reinforcement levels: BR, W = 2.48 and L = 1.53; AM , W = 0.73
and L = 0.46; and PM , W = 4.55 and L = 3.34.
C Evaluated at the following average Win and Loss reinforcement levels: BR, W = 2.25 and L = 1.32; AM , W = 0.65
and L = 0.40; and PM , W = 4.07 and L = 3.05.
interest regarding gender classification, auction frame, and the number of bidders.
Figure 1 presents the estimated 100 period sequences of auction rule adoption by gender
classifications.16 At the start of the experiment, we can see Male subjects have a higher
initially probability of following the BR rule than either Female type. We also see all three
types initially use the PM rule in greater proportion than the AM rule. However, we see for
all three gender classifications the proportion adopting the PM rule drops to 10% or below
within ten periods. We also observe a steady rise of the AM rule to the 35-40% range. We
16For these series subjects are randomly assigned the sequence they face the auction frame and the number
of bidder treatments.
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also see, after an initial 10 to 20 period adjustment, the average proportional use of the BR
bidding strategy Males, HP Females, and LP Females respectively are 65%, 60%, and 55%.
These initial conditions are quite different than those reported by Shachat and Wei (2012);
their U.S. and Singaporean subject pools show much higher initial strategic behavior. But
surprisingly the convergence of rule adoption proportions is quite similar. This suggests we
have identified robust learning.
































































































































Figure 1: Estimated sequences by gender of subject proportions using the AM , PM , and
BR rules
One of this paper’s innovations is introducing endogenous transition probabilities con-
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ditional upon the reinforcements of auction outcomes. Differences in the bidding rule pa-
rameter values and varying auction conditions such as the number of bidders can generate
varying patterns of learning and rule adoption. Differing patterns are not possible when the
matrix P is exogenous as in Shachat and Wei (2012).
Figure 2 is a 4×3 array of sequence plots that exhibits how the rule learning dynamics
vary according to the number of bidders, auction frame, and gender.17 The four rows in the
array correspond to each of the 25 period blocks of the within crossing of the auction frame
and the number of bidder treatment variables. The columns correspond to the three gender
classifications. In the 3 bidder auctions we observe fairly stable patterns previously noted
when looking at the 100 period sequences. In contrast, the 6 bidder auctions all exhibit
diminishing adoption of the BR and a corresponding increasing the use of the AM . A final
general feature of this array is that gender differences in how a bidder responds to auction
outcomes and differences in bidding rule parameters leads to Males behaving more strategic
in most settings.
5.4 The sources of gender differences in earnings
We conclude or analysis by identifying the sources of gender earning differences accord-
ing to the estimated HMBM. The estimated HMBM exhibits gender differences both in the
propensities to follow alternative rules and in the amount of surplus demanded in each bid-
ding rule. We report the results of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder,
1973) that allow us to attribute how much of the observed gender differences in earnings
result from each of these two sources.
We construct statistics regarding the proportion of periods that subjects follow each rule
and their earnings when using each rule. We start by tracking the random draw of the rule
state for each subject and match it with his actual period earnings in each of the final 2000
MCMC iterations. We group these matched sequences by gender classification. For each
17For these series, subjects are randomly assigned to which 25 period block they face the depicted treat-
ment.
23































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Estimated sequences by gender of subject proportions using the AM , PM , and
BR rules
auction frame, we calculate the proportion of periods that subjects follow each of the three
rules, as well as the average realized period earnings conditional upon rule. The product of
these two numbers and 50 (the number of periods of the auction frame) is our estimate of
the total earnings when following a particular rule. We present these statistics in Table 8.
Table 8 shows that Males follow the strategic best response bidding rule with greater
24
frequency than both HP and LP Females do. Further, when following the BR rule Males and
HP Females earn about the same earnings per period and more than the LP Females. This
partially explains why HP female and Males don’t have the significant earning differences in
the forward auction. The Male earnings per bid in the reverse auction is lower than in the
forward auction. Therefore, the difference of total earnings among male and female become
smaller in reverse auction.
Table 8: Posterior average frequency and earning by rule for each auction frame
Forward Reverse
Rule % use Earnings Rule Earnings % use Earnings Rule Earnings
of rule per bid Earnings Share of rule per bid Earnings Share
Male BR 0.66 0.76 25.08 0.88 0.62 0.74 22.93 0.86
AM 0.28 0.13 1.80 0.06 0.32 0.11 1.67 0.06
PM 0.06 0.50 1.53 0.05 0.07 0.66 2.18 0.08
Total 1.00 0.57 28.41 1.00 1.00 0.54 26.78 1.00
HP BR 0.56 0.74 21.01 0.74 0.55 0.71 19.64 0.73
AM 0.33 0.17 2.81 0.10 0.32 0.16 2.52 0.09
PM 0.11 0.82 4.41 0.16 0.12 0.75 4.59 0.17
Total 1.00 0.56 28.22 1.00 1.00 0.54 26.75 1.00
LP BR 0.60 0.63 18.94 0.83 0.55 0.65 17.83 0.73
AM 0.34 0.15 2.58 0.11 0.38 0.11 2.04 0.08
PM 0.06 0.43 1.27 0.06 0.07 1.37 4.59 0.19
Total 1.00 0.46 22.80 1.00 1.00 0.49 24.46 1.00
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition allow us to ask what part of the gender differences
in earnings comes from females using rules that demand less surplus and what part comes
from females spending a larger proportion of time following non-strategic rules. Consider





where yg is the average earnings per bid, pˆig is the 3×1 vector of proportions in which rules
are followed, and xg is the 3×1 vector of earnings per bid averages of the rules. We can
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express the difference in average earnings per bid between gender types g and h as
yg − yh = pˆi′g · (xg − xh) + xh′ · (pˆig − pˆih). (2)
The first term of Equation 2 consists of the differences in average earnings for each rule
weighted by the proportions by which g uses the rules. We call this the within rule earnings
difference. The second term of equation 2 consists of the differences in the proportions with
which rules are used weighted by the average rule earnings of h. We call this the between
rule earnings difference.
Table 9 reports, by auction frame, the within rule and between rule earnings differences
for the Male type and each of the HP and LP Female types. We can see the second term
is always positive implying males always spend a larger proportion of time following with
higher earnings. However, the differences in within rule earnings are more varied and explain
why we observe gender difference in earnings. Notice for the forward auction, about 75%
of the earnings difference between Male and LP Female subjects comes from within rule
differences. While in this auction frame, HP Female subjects actually earn more than Male
subjects within rules, cancelling out the loss from spending more time following simple
bidding heuristics. In the reverse auction, the within rule earnings difference is much smaller
for Male and LP Female subjects and, despite a slightly larger between rule difference, leads
the lower overall earnings difference. We further see the within and between rule earnings
differences are essentially zero for the Male and HP Female subjects in the reverse auction.
Table 9: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender differences in earnings
Forward auction Reverse auction
Earnings difference Within rule Between rule Total Within rule Between rule Total
Male - LP Female 4.13 1.48 5.62 0.64 1.68 2.31
Male - HP Female −0.99 1.19 0.19 −0.03 0.05 0.02
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6 Conclusion
We introduced the HMBM, which provides a dynamic generalization of mixture models
of bidding in auctions. Within this flexible framework, we considered the case where auction
outcomes impact the transition probabilities between strategic best response rules and simple
rules of thumb. We applied the HMBM to a new experiment and found an interesting rule
switching dynamic. After experiencing a loss reinforcement, the probability a female subject
following the rational BR rule switches to a rule of thumb spikes. In contrast, when a subject
- both male and female - follows AM , the predominantly used rule of thumb, the probability
of switching to the rational BR rule spikes after experiencing a win reinforcement.
We don’t provide, nor are aware of, a model of optimizing behavior that generates such
dynamic responses. However, we conjecture the following. Individuals appreciate there is a
potential benefit to choosing a strategic rule. But ascertaining which strategic rule offers the
highest reward is a difficult cognitive task, especially in our auction setting. This generates
uncertainty in the value of the calculated strategic rule. On the other hand, the value of
following a rule of thumb is easy to perceive and cognitively simple to execute. Consequently,
a negative reinforcement undermines the bidder’s confidence in his ability to successfully bid
strategically. This leads to abandoning the pursuit of the less certain-higher reward strategy
in favor of the easier to value rule of thumb. In the other direction, a win reinforcement
when following the rule of thumb stirs a sense of lost opportunity from not trying to identify
and pursue a more profitable strategic rule.
We find that women are sensitive to this loss reinforcement, while men are not. This,
along with parameter variations within rules, provides a behavioral principle for observed
gender differences in auction performance. This differential response to loss reinforcement
could be an important phenomenon across a wide variety of settings. For example, Gill and
Prowse (2012) study gender differences in productivity in real effort tournament competition.
They find losing a competition negatively impacts females’ effort levels in subsequent compe-
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titions. Interestingly, much like our result for LP Females, the reduction of subsequent effort
is sensitive to experiencing the loss reinforcement state but not to the size of the lost prize.
Male productivity is not sensitive to this loss reinforcement unless the prize is sufficiently
large. Further we conjecture this same dynamic is a plausible explanation of women learning
more rapidly than men to avoid the winner’s curse in common value auctions (Casari et al.,
2007).
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A Deriving the strategic BR bidding rule
We first consider the case of the forward auction. Suppose bBR(vit) is a strictly increasing
continuous bounded function, and thus has a continuous inverse. Now consider bidder j who
follows the BR rule; he chooses the bid pjt to maximize his expected utility conditional upon


















where piBR = 1 − piAM − piPM . Since each of the three bidding rules has an inverse we can
restate this probability, with F denoting the uniform distribution on [L,H], as














The probability bidder j wins an n bidder auction is the probability pjt is the first order
statistic of the n realized bids, or





Thus, bidder j’s expected utility from bidding pjt conditional on realized value vjt is,





pjt − κ− L































Now if one assumes that all BR bidders use the same bid function, the above expression
reduces to the following differential equation:
vit − L− κpiAM − ρ1+ρpiPM





η(n− 1) + 1)(piAM + piPM
1 + ρ
)
The solution this differential equation and the BR bidding rule is
bBR(vit) =
(L+ piAMκ)(1 + ρ)




where M = η(n− 1) + 1.
The derivation of the BR rule for the reverse auction frame is found in Shachat and Wei
(2012).
B The MCMC estimation of the HMBM
This paper adopts a Bayesian methodology to make inferences regarding the parameters
and unobserved components of the HMBM. The HMBM is a statistical process with three
components. First, we can write the state space of linear bid functions as, bAM(vit, zi, fit)bPM(vit, zi, fit)
bBR(vit, zi, fit, nit)
 =
 κ(zi, fit) 10 (1 + ρ(zi, fit))








Let Φ denote the matrix of bidding rule parameters and Σ = (σ2r(zi)) denote the vector of
heteroscedastic variances of the bidding rule perturbations. Second, Γ indicates the matrix
of the parameters of the transition matrix P , where each row of Γ consists of the multinomial
probit model parameters of the corresponding bidding rule. Third, Π1 is the multinomial
distribution governing the initial assignment of bidding rules and has the parameters piAM
and piPM . The output of the HMBM consists of the observable the sequences of bids and
auctions outcomes, B and O respectively, for each bidder, and the unobservable sequence
of bidding rules, S, adopted by each bidder. Also, for notational convenience, let V be the
collection of all Vi’s.
Consider the joint posterior density function of the HMBM parameters and the unob-
served realized state sequences, h(S,Φ,Σ,Γ,Π1|B, V,O). We first assume that parameters
of the bidding rules are independent from the auction outcomes. Then we express this joint
density as the product of the marginal density of HMBM parameters conditional on the
observed bids, values, and outcomes; and the unobserved states with the marginal density
of the states conditional upon action choices and outcomes.
h(S,Φ,Σ,Γ,Π1|B, V,O) = h(Φ,Σ,Γ,Π1|S,B, V,O)h(S|B, V,O).
Next, we assume the distribution of the bidding rule parameters are independent of the
distribution of the rule transition probability parameters when both are condition upon the
observable elements (B, V,O). This allows us to state
h(S,Φ,Σ,Γ,Π1|B, V,O) = h(Φ,Σ|S,B, V )h(Γ,Π1|S,O)h(S|B, V,O). (3)
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This product of three conditional posteriors permits a simple Markov Chain procedure of
sequentially sampling from these distributions. The MCMC approach relies on augmenting
the parameter space with filtered values of the unobserved states S, and using Gibbs sampling
procedures generate sequential draws from the marginal distributions of equation 3. After
a large number of iterations, indexed by l, the empirical density of these draws converges
in probability to the true posterior density functions (Geman and Geman, 1987). The first
iteration of MCMC algorithm, l = 0, starts with the construction of S0 by random draws
from the uniform multinomial distribution, Π01 from the uniform Dirichlet distribution, and
draws for all values parameter values Φ0, Σ0, and Γ0 from the standard uniform distribution.
Iterations l > 0, consists of the following three steps.
Step 1: Sample Φ(l) and Σ(l) by using S(l−1), B, V ;
Step 2: Sample S(1) by using Γ(l−1), O, and S(l−1); and
Step 3: Sample Γ(l) by using S(l), Ψ(l) and O.
The Gibbs sampler is run for a large number of iterations until the empirical distribution
of all the parameters has converged according to the convergence test of Geweke (1991). Then
the sampling procedure is allowed to continue to run for another number of iterations to build
up an empirical distribution that corresponds to the posterior distribution of the HMBM
parameters. It is from this empirical distribution that we conduct statistical inferences. We
now describe the three steps of an iteration of the Gibbs sampler in detail.
Step 1: Sampling the rule parameters {Φ, Σ}(l)
Given the values of S, We can summarize all the gender specific rules summarized as
linear models:
bs(vit|g) = φgs0 + φgs1vit + gsit.
Define Bgs to be the vector of bids when subjects of gender type g adopt rule s, and Vgs to
be the matrix of right-hand side variables when subjects adopt rule s. We start by assuming




gs ) follows the Normal-Inverse Gamma distribution,
N-IG(φ˜s, A˜s, σ˜2s). Note the prior parameters are generally set to zero, except for the slope
term in the AM rule where we use the point prior φgAM1 = 1 and the intercept term in the
PM rule where we use the point prior φgPM0 = 0.
The posterior distribution of (φgs, σ
2
gs) has the Normal-Inverse Gamma form:
φgs ∼ N
(











where ν¯gs is the degrees of freedom of the linear model, the number of time gender type g
uses rule s in the sequence of states S.
We draw values for (σ2gs)
(l) from the posterior inverse-gamma distribution with ν¯s and

































Where φ˜gs, A˜gs and σ˜
2
gs are the prior parameters. Value of φ
(l)
gs can be drawn from the normal
distribution with the variance (σ2gs)
(l). The prior parameters φ˜gs, A˜gs and σ˜2gs are chosen to





The restriction is consistent with the E-MLE results of Shachat and Wei (2012).
Step 2: Sampling the state sequences S(l)
To generate s
(l)
it , we start at t = 100 and recursively calculate state probabilities. Then
we determine state s
(l)
it by taking a realization from the standard uniform distribution and
comparing it to the calculated state probabilities. The formula for the state probabilities are
Pr(s
(l)















it = r|s(l−1)it−1 , oit−1,Γ(l−1)
)
if t = 100
Pr
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it+1|s(l)it = r, oit,Γ(l−1)
)
if 2 < t < 100
Pr
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it+1|s(l)it = r, oit,Γ(l−1)
)
if t = 1
.




For each gender specific Πg1 we assume a uniform Dirichlet prior, D(Πg1,s; dAM , dPM , dBR)
by setting the shape parameters, ds to one. The Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior
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for the multinomial distribution, and the shape parameters of the conditional posterior are
simply the number of occurrences of each state in the first element of the sequences of gender
type g bidders in S(l). Let n0g,j be the number incidences of s
(l)
i,1 = j for g type bidders. Thus,
the conditional posterior is
h(Πg1,s|S(l)) = h(Πg1,s; dAM + n0g,AM , dPM + n0g,PM , dBR + n0g,BR).
We generate Π
(l)
g1 by sampling from this distribution.
To characterize the marginal conditional posterior distribution for the rule transition
probability matrix parameters Γ and to generate a sample Γ(l), we use the methods intro-
duced by Albert and Chib (1993) and Filardo and Gordon (1998). First, reduce the three
indices of equation 1 to two by normalize on the BR rule as follows18;
Ψj1it = Ψ
jAM
it −ΨjBRit and Ψj2it = ΨjPMit −ΨjBRit .
Now we can restate the transition probabilities; Given S, Γ and the following inequality
constraint:
Pr(sit = BR|sit−1, oit−1) = Pr(Ψsit−11it−1 ≤ 0,Ψsit−12it−1 ≤ 0)
Pr(sit = PM |sit−1, oit−1) = Pr(Ψsit−11it−1 ≥ Ψsit−12it−1 ,Ψsit−11it−1 ≥ 0).
Pr(sit = AM |sit−1, oit−1) = Pr(Ψsit−12it−1 ≥ Ψsit−11it−1 ,Ψsit−12it−1 ≥ 0)
We construct realized values of the Ψj1it and Ψ
j2
it by using Γ
(l−1), s(l)it , and oit with perturbations
randomly generated from the appropriate truncated bivariate normal distributions. These
realized normalized indices are now simple linear regression models with unit variance. With
the known variance and assumed normal distributed prior with zero mean, the conditional
posterior distribution is also normal and we can generate draws similarly to how we do in
Step 1.
18Note that this normalization highlights that γjkzi is not identified, only the differences between rules
indices under neutral reinforcement are.
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